Iran, Israel, and the United States by Ofira Seliktar Farhad Rezaei

Author:Ofira Seliktar,Farhad Rezaei
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781498569767
Publisher: Lexington Books, a division of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 6

The Cost of Principalism

Bankrupting Iran

The View from Tehran

Facing an election on June 12, 2009, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad found it increasingly difficult to defend the cost of nuclear Principalism. As the punishing sanctions degraded the Iranian economy, the ballot promised to turn into a referendum on the nuclear program. To influence the public opinion, the government ordered the media to highlight the positive aspects of making Iran into a nuclear nation, including the alleged scientific prowess of the country. The media also carried numerous stories about how Ahmadinejad had managed to create a division between the Europeans, the Russians, and the Chinese on the one hand, and Washington on the other. In the president’s view, the split all but assured that the sanctions policy would fail. Conversely, the government banned papers and television from discussing the US military maneuvers in the region, which many viewed as a forerunner of an invasion.1

The May 2008 Majlis election offered a preview of the presidential ballot. Ahmadinejad and his allies took nothing for granted. As early as January 31, 2008, Major General Ali Jafari, the Revolutionary Guards chief, urged a meeting of Guards and Basij commanders to work to elect Principalists in the forthcoming election. Soon after, Major General Hassan Firoozabadi, Iran’s armed forces chief of staff, and Colonel Massoud Jazaeri, an unofficial spokesman, assailed the opposition as “less than loyal citizens who are intimidated by the enemy.” The Guardian Council backed up such claims by disqualifying reformist candidates across the board, an act that gave the conservative forces two-third of the seats.2

But the Guards and the Guardian Council could do little to protect Ahmadinejad in the presidential election where his foreign policy came under a withering critique. All three opposition candidates—Mir-Hossein Mousavi, Mohsen Rezaei, and Mahdi Karroubi—criticized Ahmadinejad’s confrontational foreign policy style, describing it as unnecessary, provocative, and costly. Mousavi, the leading contender ran as an independent, having become close to the reformist camp of Khatami. Mousavi took issue with Ahmadinejad’s provocative rhetoric toward Israel and the Holocaust, asking: “If a crime has taken place, why deny it?”3

Yet it was the cost of the nuclear program to the Iranian citizen that formed the heart of the campaign against Ahmadinejad and his Principalists. His opponents, a collation of former Khatami reformers and other moderates, charged that since the common people were most affected, it was only fair that they should be allowed to vote on the continuation of the program. As Mousavi put it: “Decision must be based on general consent”—a procedure available in the Constitution. Opposition politicians warned that another five years of Ahmadinejad would bring more international isolation and put the regime’s survival at risk. In the words of Mousavi, “It’s clear that the sanctions will negatively impact on the country’s security and put the economy in jeopardy.” More to the point, the moderates urged to negotiate a deal with the EU-3 and normalize relations with the international community, a position which earned them the name “Normalizers.”4

Watching the pressure on Ahmadinejad mount

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